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Abstract
The aim of this paper is to critically explore whether crowdsourced Big Data enables an inclusive humanitarian response
at times of crisis. We argue that all data, including Big Data, are socially constructed artefacts that reflect the contexts
and processes of their creation. To support our argument, we qualitatively analysed the process of ‘Big Data making’ that
occurred by way of crowdsourcing through open data platforms, in the context of two specific humanitarian crises,
namely the 2010 earthquake in Haiti and the 2015 earthquake in Nepal. We show that the process of creating Big Data
from local and global sources of knowledge entails the transformation of information as it moves from one distinct group
of contributors to the next. The implication of this transformation is that locally based, affected people and often the
original ‘crowd’ are excluded from the information flow, and from the interpretation process of crowdsourced crisis
knowledge, as used by formal responding organizations, and are marginalized in their ability to benefit from Big Data in
support of their own means. Our paper contributes a critical perspective to the debate on participatory Big Data, by
explaining the process of in and exclusion during data making, towards more responsive humanitarian relief.
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Introduction
In this paper we analyse the Big Data making processes
deployed by a new type of (semi-formal) humanitarian
organization in disaster settings: the geographically dis-
persed networks of digital humanitarians (Meier, 2015).
These humanitarian networks of technology volunteers
rely on crowdsourcing and are organized around open
civic technology platforms. Global attention to this
way of making big crisis data was catalysed by the
2010 earthquake in Haiti. During this disaster, the
open source platform Ushahidi was used to produce a
crisis map based on volunteer-driven information shar-
ing, generating around 50,000 incident reports (Gao
et al., 2011; Morrow et al., 2011). At the time of the
crisis, this map was proclaimed by the US Federal
Emergency Management Authority (FEMA) as the
‘the most comprehensive and up-to-date source of
information on Haiti for the humanitarian community’
(as reported in Heinzelman and Waters (2010: 9)).
Thus, this new way of organizing at times of disaster
is often celebrated as a Big Data success, with the
potential to more effectively address on-the-ground
needs, while also enabling people’s agency (e.g.,
World Bank, 2013).
Crowdsourcing and open data platforms in humani-
tarian disaster settings are widely advocated in both
scholarly and practitioner domains. Whilst such inter-
ventions can play an important role in acquiring vital
situational knowledge to aid response efforts, the
underlying assumption that such methods by default
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strengthen citizen’s participation in a humanitarian
response is worth critically examining. We show how
data collected through crowdsourcing by digital
humanitarians is often transferred and mutated
through editing by different actors in the social process
that links crisis knowledge derived from ‘the crowd’, via
volunteer efforts, to formal aid organizations. In other
words, people directly affected by the crisis are often
excluded from information processing and interpret-
ation, and marginalized in subsequent response
decision-making that affect their very lives.
By critically examining the processes through which
digital humanitarians create Big Data, we aim to pro-
vide more clarity on how and to what degree affected
citizens can contribute to and access humanitarian
crisis information. Such understanding is important to
help this new type of humanitarian organization
improve the preconditions for enabling citizen partici-
pation through Big Data in a humanitarian response.
We flip the conventional view of data as the raw build-
ing blocks of knowledge, arguing instead that data is
generated from different sources of knowledge.
Extending this perspective, we explain the social pro-
cess that underlies the creation, editing and translation
of data and show how exclusion can inadvertently
result from crowdsourcing initiatives that aspire to rea-
lizing precisely the opposite.
The paper is based on our familiarity with the 2010
Haiti crisis and on fieldwork in Nepal, carried out two
months after the 2015 earthquake and a second visit a
year later. By exploring crowdsourcing and open data
initiatives that were used in the immediate aftermath of
these crises, we aim to establish how community
participation in creating – and using – crisis data was
enabled and hindered in these crowdsourced aid efforts,
what efforts were undertaken by crowdsourcing
platforms to address barriers to inclusion and what
challenges still remain. Thus, the paper is guided by
the overall research question: How can the promise of
participatory Big Data be understood from a critical view
on inclusive humanitarian data making?
First we introduce and take position within the cur-
rent debate on Big Data within the context of humani-
tarian response. Next, we outline how crowdsourcing
and open access platforms were used in the immediate
aftermath of the earthquake in Haiti, drawing on the
examples of Open Street Map (OSM) and Ushahidi.
We then compare the response to Haiti with the
Nepal earthquake disaster and in particular the
humanitarian aid efforts undertaken by Kathmandu
Living Labs (KLL), Code for Nepal and the Mobile
Citizens Helpdesks. Finally, we discuss the implications
of our study for research and practice, and conclude
with an overall assessment of the extent to which
crowdsourcing humanitarian Big Data enables different
socially constituted groups to participate in the creation
and management of crisis data. That is, we analyse to
what extent crowdsourcing Big Data contributes to an
inclusive humanitarian response.
Community participation in Big Data
Digital humanitarians believe in the empowering
potential of open Big Data (Meier, 2015). Especially
open, crowdsourced Big Data is seen to have the poten-
tial to foster democracy and innovation due to its trans-
parency and broad stakeholder base (Baack, 2015).
In this paper, we interpret big crisis data as referring
to all datafied – and datafiable – information about the
disaster at hand that people knowingly (and unknow-
ingly) share electronically – either directly or through
intermediaries. It covers a wide array of channels and
formats, ranging from Facebook and Twitter messages,
to (online) government records, to content created by
formal media outlets, to responses and comments rec-
orded in needs assessment surveys NGOs (summarize
and) post online (Kitchin, 2014).
Open data is data that is made freely available,
accessible for all to use as needed. In order to facilitate
empowerment through open data, activists have devel-
oped civic technologies, specialized applications run on
open data platforms that aim to connect people in
order to ‘improve public services or help citizens to
coordinate with each other to solve problems together’
(Baack, 2015: 7). In other words, by opening up data,
citizens are expected to gain access to information that
informs policies, strategies and actions taken by gov-
ernments, firms and other organizations and become
more actively engaged in decision-making processes
that affect them (e.g., Baack, 2015). This perspective
builds on the long-standing participation debate,
aimed at fostering aid efforts that are more inclusive
of intended beneficiaries (Hickey and Mohan, 2004),
and which has also been addressed in the context of
ICT-enabled information exchange (Ferguson and
Soekijad, 2015).
In addition to aiming to provide citizens with access
to data that informs the decisions made by govern-
ments and other formal organizations, civic technology
platforms sometimes set out to enable citizens to add to
and edit this data. This is often done through crowd-
sourcing, a method of data creation originally defined
as ‘the act of taking a job traditionally performed by a
designated agent [. . .] and outsourcing it to an unde-
fined, generally large group of people in the form of an
open call’ (Howe, 2008: 99). In this paper we distin-
guish between limited, functional data sets and Big
Data: whereas the information contained in the
former could in theory be processed by a small team
with a desktop computer, Big Data is so vast and
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abundant that ‘we have to turn to other means of
analysis: people working together, or [with multiple]
computers, or both’ (Horowitz, 2008).
Crowdsourcing in our humanitarian cases refers to a
method of creating a limited, functional data set from
Big Data, both by filtering and processing existing
shared, verbalized information and by encouraging
the creation of new data from hitherto unshared know-
ledge. Its distinguishing feature is that its method is
social and that the resulting data set is user generated,
as opposed to the product of a formal institution
(Kaplan and Haenlein, 2010). Crowdsourcing, then,
refers to both the social creation and filtering of Big
Data. The open data humanitarian civic technologies
we discuss in this paper aim to use crowdsourcing to
enable communities to share their knowledge about the
(local impact of) the disaster and their needs with the
wider world.
The ambition to empower communities by including
their local knowledge into data sets used by govern-
ment and other organizations is well established, yet
contested. Indeed, the ideal of development is often
expressed as people’s freedom to pursue their interests
independently and be able to fulfil their fundamental
human needs (Sen, 1999). This refers to both material
interests and needs (such as a dependable livelihood
and a clean environment) and non-material interests
and needs (such as social inclusion and the ability to
participate in politics) (Madon, 2000). Given that the
fulfilment of the interests and needs of intended bene-
ficiaries is increasingly recognized as a key indicator of
development, the inclusion of local communities in
development planning and agenda setting is at the
heart of the academic and practitioners’ debate on par-
ticipatory aid and development (Cooke and Kothari,
2001; Hickey and Mohan, 2004).
Central to such an approach is the idea that people’s
local knowledge be incorporated into project planning
(Mosse, 2001). However, the idea that local knowledge
or individual needs simply exist – to be recorded and
taken into account in humanitarian or development
programme planning – is problematic, as for instance
Mosse (2001) contends: ‘local knowledge (such as com-
munity needs, interests, priorities and plans) is a con-
struct of the [programme] planning context, behind
which is concealed a complex [. . .] politics of knowledge
production and use’ (2001: 387). Indeed, local know-
ledge that is created in a development context for the
purpose of a specific project will often end up reflecting
both local power dynamics as well as outside agendas,
such as those of the international agencies that fund
the project (Ferguson et al., 2010). The reason for
this is the fact that communities often strategically
choose to present a list of ‘local needs’ that meet certain
criteria (i.e. that are perceived as ‘legitimate’ needs by
the agency and its global donor) and that fit the com-
munity’s perception of what the project is able to offer
(Mosse, 2001). As such, local knowledge tends to be the
product of both local and global factors.
We adopt a similar approach, recognizing know-
ledge as a contested social construct (Brown and
Duguid, 2001), to explore how the context and process
of data creation shape the content of local knowledge in
big crisis data. Our starting point is that all data,
including Big Data, are human artefacts. We draw on
this perspective to explore the co-creation of Big Data
by groups of actors in the aftermath of two recent
humanitarian crises, the 2010 earthquake in Haiti and
the 2015 earthquakes in Nepal. Approaching Big Data
as a social construct allows us to shed light on how the
process of Big Data making shapes the data set as well
as citizens’ ability to use this data set for their own
ends. Our aim in examining Big Data making is to
identify and explain the social processes that enable
citizen participation – as well as those that limit such
inclusion.
Crowdsourcing in disaster settings
When a major crisis unfolds, it is a tremendous chal-
lenge to satisfy the information needs of humanitarian
responders. In particular, access to up-to-date data on
the physical layout of the affected area, the location of
vital infrastructure and services is critical. Moreover, to
develop the situational awareness that is needed to act,
responders need information on what assistance is
required where, and what has already been done
(Stanton et al., 2001). For this reason, maps are of
great importance during crisis response (Meier, 2015).
However, in rapidly urbanizing developing countries,
existing maps and data sets held by governments or
private firms tend to be of limited use, if they are
made available at all. One reason for this is that
particularly in developing countries, built-up areas gen-
erally grow and morph organically, often without
formal registration or in ways that do not correspond
with official planning. As a result, existing data
sets become quickly outdated and do not reflect peo-
ple’s experience of their current physical environment.
The context of Haiti provides a frequently cited
example of such a situation, similarly to the present-
day situation of Nepal, both of which comprise the
setting of our study.
Crowdsourcing in post-earthquake Haiti: From the
margins to the centre of relief work
Haiti was stuck by a 7.0 magnitude earthquake on
12 January 2010. At this time, crowdsourcing for
social ends was already well established, but fairly
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marginal to humanitarian relief work in disaster set-
tings. However, the deployment of crowdsourcing plat-
forms, especially OSMs and Ushahidi, during the
immediate aftermath of the Haiti earthquake gave
this approach enormous momentum.
OSMs, known as ‘the Wikipedia of maps’, is a
volunteer-driven platform that aims to make crowd-
sourced geospatial data freely accessible. The
Ushahidi platform was created in 2008 to enable the
mapping of crowdsourced information about the vio-
lence that followed the 2007–8 elections in Kenya. The
platform enables the datafication of information pulled
from online community platforms such as Facebook,
Twitter and blogs, as well as information received via
text message. On the basis of this data, reports can be
created and categorized according to their content.
In the direct aftermath of the Haiti crisis, crowdsour-
cing through these platforms addressed a significant
crisis information gap that up to that point had
remained unfilled. For the first time humanitarian
organizations had systematic access to live, local situ-
ational knowledge. The volunteers were credited with
creating the most up to date, reliable and detailed map
of Port au Prince’s downtown area, providing more
detail than Google Maps or the maps used by FEMA
at the time (Meier and Munro, 2010). Thus, the Haiti
crisis catalysed the idea and momentum behind crisis
data crowdsourcing, and many responding organiza-
tions are now seeking to systematically incorporate
this innovation in their approach (e.g., OCHA,
UNICEF (Batty, 2010), the UN Logistics Base and
the IOM (Soden and Palen, 2014)).
Crowdsourcing in post-earthquake Haiti:
Information flows
When the earthquake struck, 600 remotely located
OSM volunteers came online and quickly built a base
layer map of the affected areas, almost from scratch
(Soden and Palen, 2014). On the basis of satellite
images, digital humanitarians (Meier, 2015) identified
roads, damaged buildings and camps for internally dis-
placed persons. The Ushahidi platform was also
quickly deployed, initially run by a small group of vol-
unteer crisis mappers who scraped social and trad-
itional media sources for actionable pieces of
information. After four days, the technology volunteers
set up a telephone number – 4636 – where Haitians
could send information via text (SMS) for free. They
further developed an internet-based system called
Mission4636 to process all the incoming text messages
(Heinzelman and Waters, 2010; Meier, 2015). The free
phone number linked to Mission4636 received 1000–
2000 text messages per day from affected citizens
(Heinzelman and Waters, 2010: 7). As these text
messages were mostly written in Creole, a language
most global volunteers could not read, Ushahidi crowd-
sourced over 1000 volunteers from the Haitian dias-
pora, living in the USA or Canada, to translate these
messages into English.
Mission4636 was published widely through social
networks. People were encouraged to share crisis rele-
vant information through the website via text message
or email. Members of the Haitian diaspora posted
information they had received through relatives.
Volunteers processed all the different types of informa-
tion into crisis reports, which they categorized by topic,
such as medical emergencies, trapped individuals and
specific needs. They subsequently located the GPS
coordinates of the physical location of the situation
described in the report and, where possible, mapped it
using the OSM platform. Reports containing commen-
tary but no actionable data were filed away under the
category ‘insufficient data’ (Sutherlin, 2013: 402).
The crowdsourcing process in Haiti was marked by
three distinct crowds: the digital humanitarians, the
people based in Haiti affected by the earthquake and
global volunteer translators (Sutherlin, 2013). Figure 1
presents a screenshot of Mission4636, showing the cate-
gories and geo-locations of the crisis reports. Access to
these reports and maps was in theory open to all who
had an internet connection.
The information flows marking the crowdsourcing
process in Haiti are represented in Figure 2. Although
information sourcing was relatively efficient, the figure
shows that there were very few feedback loops, and
information sharing enabled by the platform tended
to flow in one direction only. First, the information
provided by affected people based in Haiti (online
crowd 1) flowed to translators engaged via the platform
as volunteers (online crowd 2), who converted it into
English. This is indicated by a large red arrow, indicat-
ing one-way flow of information as translations were
only carried out in one direction, from Creole to
English, but not vice versa. Second, translated informa-
tion flowed from the translators to the digital humani-
tarians (online crowd 3), and again not vice versa.
Finally, digital humanitarians converted the translated
messages into reports and put these on a map, but did
not send reports back to the translators to be converted
into Creole for the benefit of local Haitians.
Naturally, there was some overlap between the three
crowds, e.g. some volunteers from the diaspora both
carried out translations and helped with the mapping
of data reports. Furthermore, there were pre-existing,
personal connections and linkages between members of
the different groups. These personal networks enabled
two-way flows of information within the crowdsourcing
project, as marked by the green arrows. However, these
feedback loops had not been purposefully designed into
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Figure 2. Information flows in post-earthquake crisis data crowdsourcing, Haiti 2010.
Figure 1. Screenshot of Mission4636 (run on the Ushahidi platform using OSM) for the 2010 Haiti Earthquake.
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the crowdsourcing process and were not specifically
supported by the platform. As such, they were sparse
and serendipitous.
Crowdsourcing in post-earthquake Nepal:
Small-scale Nepali initiatives
Five years after the earthquake in Haiti, Nepal was
struck by two major earthquakes in quick succession.
The first, on 25 April 2015, reached a magnitude of 7.8
on the Richter scale, and the second, on 12 May,
reached 7.3 (Nepal Risk Reduction Portal). At this
point, information crowdsourcing was fairly estab-
lished in disaster settings, but largely driven by open
data activists rather than formal humanitarian organ-
izations. Since Haiti, the World Bank had played an
active role in supporting open data crowdsourcing pro-
jects towards humanitarian aid. Indeed, two of the
three initiatives discussed in this section, KLL and
Code for Nepal, are (indirectly) linked to the World
Bank in that founding members and current leaders
at these organizations also work(ed) for the World
Bank. The key lesson for the World Bank based on
the deployment of open data crowdsourcing platforms
in Haiti was that the effectiveness and sustainability of
such an approach depended to a significant extent
on local ownership, that is to say, on the leadership
of locally based stakeholders.
The OSM community shared this view. They had
come to regard community participation as the best
way of ensuring that maps had actual relevance and
were up to date with local knowledge. Furthermore,
they saw the active involvement of affected stake-
holders in the platform as ethically appropriate, given
their significance as intended beneficiaries (Soden and
Palen, 2014). The main difference, then, between the
two settings, is that the information flows that mark
the crowdsourcing process in Haiti were mainly linear
whereas in the Nepali crowdsourcing initiatives dis-
cussed below, an effort was made to create information
loops that linked back to the affected communities.
Furthermore, the efforts in Haiti were primarily led
by remotely based volunteers with no personal links
to Haiti, whereas the projects discussed below were
initiated and led by Nepalis.
KLL
When the first earthquake struck Nepal in April 2015,
thousands of remotely located volunteers from the
Humanitarian OSM Team used satellite imagery in
order to rapidly complete the maps of Nepal the
Nepali OSM community had been developing. A lead-
ing organization in the Nepali OSM community is
KLL, which was founded in 2013 by a group of
people (predominantly Nepali open data enthusiasts)
who had previously worked together on an
Open Cities Project in Kathmandu initiated by the
World Bank.
In the immediate aftermath of the first earthquake,
KLL quickly developed QuakeMap, a civic technology
that runs on the Ushahidi platform. Through
QuakeMap, KLL crowdsourced information on local
needs: affected people could report their requirements
via a hotline, SMS or through an online form. KLL
then checked this data (often by telephone) and created
a crisis data report, which it categorized and placed on
a map. The aim of QuakeMap was to connect people
affected by earthquakes with responding organizations.
Both data reports and map were freely accessible
online. Some of the first responders who used the
data were in-country volunteers who organized them-
selves around the Yellow House guesthouse. These vol-
unteers were recruited via word of mouth and through
a Facebook page called Himalayan Disaster Relief
Volunteer Group. The Yellow House volunteers were
among the first to send supplies to western
Sindhupalchowk and Gorkha, some of the worst hit
regions in the country (Streep, 2015).
Quakemap itself was available in English, Nepalese
and Hindi, but the reports were in English and remained
untranslated. Nevertheless, unlike Haiti where non-
English speakers were practically cut-off from ‘their’
crisis information once it had been translated, the
people at QuakeMap actively sought to link back to
the people who had originally provided the data. By
telephone they checked the accuracy of the data at the
opening of a report, while the report remained open, and
at its closing. As the people who reported needs to
QuakeMap – or the humanitarian responders who
used this data – often did not provide updates on aid
received or delivered, KLL took a very active role in
creating feedback loops by chasing this data.
The screenshot of QuakeMap (Figure 3) shows that
the vast majority of data reports were geo-tagged as in
the Kathmandu valley. However, this predominance is
not due to this region suffering the greatest impact: in
fact, the rural areas adjacent to the Kathmandu valley
were most heavily affected: Gorkha, Dhading,
Nuwakot, Rasuwa, Kavrepalanchok, Dolakha and
Sindhupalchok (OSOCC, 2015). Instead, the map
shows the infrastructure of earthquake-related big
crisis data, specifically the locational density of online
participation, as will be discussed below.
Code for Nepal
Humanitarian response organizations are under tre-
mendous pressure to be seen to be doing something
to address a crisis, especially during the first few
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weeks following a disaster. In Nepal, a disproportion-
ate amount of information about the earthquake came
from and was focused on the Kathmandu valley area
during this initial period, which resulted in many agen-
cies focusing on this region. This imbalance was of
course recognized by a number of formal and grass-
roots organizations who were familiar with the Nepali
context, such as Code for Nepal (‘Code’) and
Accountability Lab, discussed below. Founded in
2014, ‘Code’ is a small US non-profit organization,
staffed predominantly by members of the Nepali dias-
pora. Code lobbies for open data and aims to address
the digital inequalities that mark that country. Code
projects are aimed at making public data (e.g., about
the humanitarian response) available and accessible to
Nepali citizens.
When the first earthquake struck Nepal, the team at
Code was keen to shift the focus of the humanitarian
response towards other regions beyond Kathmandu
that were badly affected (CodeForNepal, 2015;
Kumar, 2015). In order to achieve this, the team
turned to crowdsourcing, deliberately using a low-tech
digital approach in order to lower barriers to participa-
tion. They relied on commonly used digital tools and
mainstream social media, launching a Google
Document on Facebook that listed needs and resources
by region in order to connect volunteers and people
that had been affected. Instructions on how to suggest
edits and/or verify the data contained within the docu-
ment were included in the document. Anyone with
moderate digital literacy and familiarity with Google
Docs could use it: no additional training or specialist
ICT knowledge was required. Indeed, the document
was shared more than 7500 times.
Mobile citizen helpdesks (MCH)
MCH was initiated by the NGOs Accountability Lab
and Local Interventions Group, in partnership with
the Nepali government. Like Code, MCH aimed to
close ‘the loop on information related to the earth-
quake response to ensure relief efforts reach those
most in need’ (Mobile Citizen Helpdesks, 2015).
Unlike Code, MCH combined both online and offline
methods for collecting and sharing crisis relevant
information. The project provided a platform for
affected communities and responders to report gaps
at the last mile of humanitarian relief distribution.
The MCH targeted the 15 most affected districts out-
side the capital city. They were run by district coord-
inators and volunteers in Kathmandu. The project was
supported by a toll free number for SMS text messages
and a 1234 hotline, manned by volunteers based at the
Nepalese Home Ministry. The aim of the initiative was
to facilitate a two-way flow of information: MCH
monitored the overall response and gathered informa-
tion at the local level. They then used these insights to
help local people obtain information they needed and
to explain the decisions donors and the Nepalese gov-
ernment had taken.
In sum, unlike the Haiti mapping efforts, the three
initiatives described above were marked by two-way
Figure 3. Screenshot of QuakeMap (run on the Ushahidi Platform using OSM) for the 2015 Nepal Earthquakes.
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feedback loops between the crowd and crowdsourced
information. However, it is worth noting that, despite
their value, these grassroots initiatives lacked the scale
required to record or address more than a fraction of all
humanitarian needs. In addition, the value of their data
sets appears to have been greatest to humanitarian
responders during the earliest phase of the relief efforts
and diminished once formal organizations had their
own information systems up and running. It also
seems that the UN agency that coordinated the initial
phase of the response in Nepal (the UN Office for the
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs) had not been
able to make effective use of the data collected through
crowdsourcing. Indeed, one year after the earthquake
many affected citizens (particularly in remote areas) still
awaited formal assistance from humanitarian, govern-
ment or grassroots initiatives, relying largely on their
own networks towards their recovery.
Crowdsourcing in post-earthquake Nepal:
Information flows
Figure 4 represents a synthesis of the communication
patterns found in the three Nepali cases discussed.
Compared to the Haiti case, volunteers powering the
online platforms in Nepal took on a far broader role: in
addition to collecting and processing local crisis data,
they also sought to generate feedback loops to locally
based people, communicating directly with them about
their needs and broadcasting information to them
about the response. Moreover, they explicitly
attempted to reach affected communities that were
not online, for instance by sending volunteers into the
communities or using low-tech collection methods.
Furthermore, in contrast to Haiti, the Nepali initiatives
did not draw on a separate crowd of translators: infor-
mation was either left untranslated, or was translated
into English by digital humanitarians or affected people
who were bilingual. Hence, the main flow of informa-
tion throughout the big crisis data making process was
similar to Haiti (i.e. from the affected online people, via
the data processing volunteers, to the analysts and deci-
sion makers at formal organizations, as indicated by
the large red arrows), but there were also smaller,
two-way flows of information between the different
groups of actors. This constitutes an important differ-
ence in terms of the reliability of the data set and the
potential of crowdsourcing initiatives to include local
people, as we explain in the next section.
Interpretation
Explaining the transformation process: From local
knowledge to Big Data
Data – including Big Data – is not simply found, but
constructed by people in specific contexts (Tuomi,
1999). Indeed, the creation of data to be processed by
computers starts with a person’s knowledge of the phe-
nomenon or situation at hand, drawing on both tacit
and explicit sources (Tuomi, 1999: 5). This local know-
ledge then undergoes a number of mutations as it is
Figure 4. Information flows in post-earthquake crisis data crowdsourcing, Nepal 2015.
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processed and transferred between the different groups
that contribute to Big Data making. In the open data
crowdsourcing initiatives thus far described, crisis-
affected citizens were able to share their knowledge
through crowdsourcing platforms by verbally trans-
forming their explicit and tacit knowledge of the crisis
into written or spoken words. This involved making
judgements about what contextual or background
knowledge had to be included in the text versus what
could be left out as superfluous.
The transformation of explicit and tacit knowledge
into verbalized information – whether into spoken
words or writing – was the first mutation of knowledge
in the datafication process. The second mutation
occurred when the verbalized information was trans-
lated into English, making it accessible to data proces-
sors and analysts without knowledge of the local
language. This one-way translation can lead to the
immediate exclusion of affected people without
English language skills. Once translated, the informa-
tion was processed by technology volunteers, which
involved another substantial mutation because the
information was now morphed to fit a pre-existing
data structure. This required data processing volunteers
to make numerous judgements about categorization,
labelling and filing. Finally, analysts at responding
organizations interpreted the data, combining it with
other data, in order to provide decision makers with
insights and advice. The migration and transformation
of knowledge in a triple-crowd crowdsourcing setting
(as in Haiti where the translators constituted a separate
crowd) is depicted in Figure 5.
Data creation thus involves many choices and judge-
ments, and draws heavily on actors’ pre-existing know-
ledge and way of seeing the world. As data migrates
from data originators, to data processors, to data users
it gets (re)interpreted in a series of different contexts by
actors who may be unfamiliar with the affected people’s
individual and shared needs. As a consequence, crowd-
sourced Big Data gets mutated during every step of the
process, and does not accurately convey what affected
people intended to communicate, but is nonetheless used
as a basis for decisions, sometimes even reinforcing
rather than mitigating inequalities, as we now explain.
Digital inequalities deriving from
crowdsourced Big Data
The in- and exclusions that characterize Big Data
making in the aftermath of a disaster do not affect all
groups of potential contributors evenly. Whereas some
groups of affected citizens experience no difficulty in
accessing and using crowdsourced open crisis data,
others lose access at some point during the knowledge
transformation process (e.g., through translation), and
some are unable to contribute their knowledge at all.
Both Haiti and Nepal are marked by numerous digital
inequalities. In both countries online participation
appears to be primarily determined by knowledge and
skills, rather than by access to physical equipment.
Digital inequality is strongly correlated with economic
inequality, physical location (e.g., rural versus urban)
and socially constituted identity markers, such as caste
and gender.1 As such, those Haitians and Nepalis who
shared their crisis knowledge in the aftermath of the
disaster through crowdsourcing were not necessarily
representative of their communities as a whole.
Indeed, socially produced crisis maps sometimes
ended up reflecting, in part, the density of people who
were able to participate online by region, rather than
the severity of needs. In our study, we saw that KLL’
QuakeMap had a disproportionately large number of
data reports geo-tagged to the Kathmandu valley area.
Generally, urban Kathmandu residents are significantly
more educated than the rest of the country. Their
online presence is further strengthened by the fact
that they are more used to – and confident in – voicing
their views than rural Nepalis. Moreover, they are more
often connected to influential people – most of whom
are based in Kathmandu – to champion their needs.
Figure 5. The migration and transformation of knowledge in a triple-crowd humanitarian crowdsourcing process.
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Discussion: Transformations in the
social construction of Big Data
In this paper, we explain how digital inequalities are
created during the Big Data making process, showing
that crowdsourced local crisis information becomes
gradually less accessible to certain affected communities
as ‘local knowledge’ is transformed through various
stages into ‘data’. We demonstrate that crowdsourced
crisis data can end up reflecting societal inequalities due
to the fact that, as a result of digital and virtual bar-
riers, certain population groups have less of an online
presence (Johnson, 2014). This raises the concern that
reliance on crowdsourced crisis data can result in these
inequalities being replicated, especially if marginalized
communities are underrepresented by or excluded from
data (Crutcher and Zook, 2009; Elwood, 2007). This is
especially an issue when responders overlook local pat-
terns of exclusion, either because they are unaware of
them (e.g., because they are foreign temporary staff) or
because they share the underlying biases that give rise
to them.
Our study shows how the process of Big Data
making in Haiti and Nepal was partly shaped by
those nations’ pre-existing patterns of socio-economic
inequalities. These patterns are the product of the co-
evolution of those societies with their environments
(Oliver-Smith and Hoffman, 2002) as well as the
(geo)political relationships that mark those countries’
histories. It is beyond the scope of this paper to describe
the unique socio-political context of humanitarian aid
in these two countries in detail, but it is worth high-
lighting that – from macro to micro level – humanitar-
ian aid is deeply political and highly contested (e.g.,
Duffield, 2016; Escobar, 2011; Ferguson et al., 2010).
This paper’s main contribution is an analysis of how a
new type of (semi-formal) humanitarian organization
operates in this arena: one that comprises a geograph-
ically dispersed network of digital humanitarians.
The central aim of digital humanitarians is to facili-
tate the creation of timely, useful and actionable infor-
mation so as to allow responders to be more adaptive to
the situation on the ground. Crowdsourcing is central
to the ways in which this new type of organization makes
data. However, in this paper we show that crowdsour-
cing can result in those people who would benefit most
from external intervention being rendered less visible –
an hence – overlooked by responders. For instance, the
QuakeMap example shows that crowdsourcing of crisis
information can result in data sets that reflect existing
inequalities, especially digital divides (Crutcher and
Zook, 2009; Elwood, 2007; Goodchild, 2007). We
argue throughout this paper that big crisis data is not
an objective entity, but is created in a social process
involving a wide variety of heterogeneous actors. We
explain how the social process of transformation that
occurs in conjunction with information transfer and
translation during Big Data making leads to the in-
and exclusion of specific stakeholders.
Our argument extends beyond a simple binary
‘included’ versus ‘excluded’ from data making and
data management as a result of access to ICT equip-
ment and (digital) literacy. As Graham (2011) points
out, resolving issues of access to technology and of
digital literacy does not enable people to connect with
anyone they want, as other (virtual or non-virtual) div-
ides may remain (Graham, 2011). For instance, people
are generally restricted to those sections of cyberspace
that are available in a language they command. They
also need knowledge and skills to navigate digital infor-
mation. Vulnerable communities may, for example,
lack access to sources and connections informing
them of the existence of online platforms through
which they can share and access crisis information.
The fact that humanitarian crowdsourcing initiatives
may inadvertently exclude certain communities from
access to their Big Data sets is problematic for another
reason: if people with relevant knowledge about
affected regions cannot check the data that has been
posted about these areas, the validity of the data set
as a whole is negatively affected. This point relates to
the usefulness and reliability of Big Data in the context
of crises. Some responders are reluctant to incorporate
data from community platforms into their work prac-
tices because such data is seen as containing too much
misinformation (Dailey and Starbird, 2014; Hughes
and Palen, 2012). Ensuring that affected communities
can access and contribute to big crisis data sets would
make it possible to engage local people in the ongoing
and live triangulation of humanitarian crisis data.
Indeed, it has been argued that this is one of the stron-
gest potential contributions of open data platforms to a
humanitarian response, enhancing the reliability of the
crowdsourced data sets (Vieweg et al., 2008).
Implications of our study and future research
Our analysis explains the transformation process that
marks Big Data making in a humanitarian context. We
build on prior debates on the social effects of datafica-
tion (Baack, 2015; Sutherin, 2013), which emphasize
that seemingly neutral processes, catalysed by the
engagement of technologies, are in fact highly contested
and can have far-reaching social implications.
This idea, that data is socially constructed to reflect
particular forms of knowledge has also been debated
in other scholarly domains, such as new media studies
(e.g., Parks, 2009), critical cartography (e.g., Crampton
et al., 2013), geoweb studies (e.g., Burns, 2015; Shelton
et al., 2014), spatial technologies (e.g., Elwood, 2007),
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development studies (Avgerou, 2008) and organization
sciences (Leonardi, 2011). However, beyond asserting
that data is socially constructed, we explain the social
process through which crowdsourced crisis data is con-
structed. Moreover, we show the important implica-
tions for a new type of semi-formal organization that
has entered the humanitarian domain: the digital
humanitarians.
This paper thereby contributes to humanitarian lit-
erature on open Big Data (Meier, 2015), in that we
explain on the one hand how humanitarian crowdsour-
cing efforts can sometimes yield counter-effective out-
comes towards an inclusive, participatory humanitarian
response and on the other hand, how these effects can
be counteracted, leading to forms of aid that are more
responsive to the affected people in need who comprise
the original data source.
Extending our study, future research on the topic of
crowdsourced Big Data in disaster settings would be
valuable. This might comprise for instance analysis of
the interplay between the geopolitics of humanitarian
aid and the actions of geographically dispersed humani-
tarian crowdsourcing networks. Alternatively studies
might further elaborate the hypothesized correlation
between inclusion in big crisis data processes and
coping and adaptive capacity of affected communities.
Another important domain of future research extend-
ing from this study relates to the ambiguous effects of
technology (cf. Morozov, 2011) and crowdsourcing in
disaster settings. Governments may, for example, base
decisions on crowdsourced data for the sake of legitim-
acy (Lehdonvirta and Bright, 2015). Hence, if crowd-
sourced data sets do not reflect what the original crowd
of affected people intended to communicate, resulting
policies may prove suboptimal. Analysis of these ambi-
guities and the politics involved in the processes of data
creation, representation and response, can help further
fine-tune the critical perspective on Big Data making
introduced in this paper.
Conclusion
In this paper, we analysed the process of Big Data
making through crowdsourcing and open data platforms
in order to explore what barriers stand in the way of this
approach enabling citizens’ agency in the aftermath of a
crisis. Following Tuomi (1999) we flipped the conven-
tional view of data as the raw building blocks of know-
ledge, arguing instead that different sources of
knowledge constitute the building blocks of data.
Through a detailed analysis of two humanitarian cases
we showed how Big Data making comprises transform-
ation of information, attending to the hidden normative
and power issues of Big Data making. Namely, our
study disclosed that Big Data making in a humanitarian
context sometimes results in counter-effective outcomes,
marginalizing rather than enabling the original crowd at
the heart of humanitarian aid efforts. As such, our paper
provides an important critical perspective on Big Data in
a humanitarian setting, as well as other domains ori-
ented towards facilitating citizens’ agency through par-
ticipatory Big Data.
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Notes
1. Digital inequalities reflect other socio-economic inequalities:
at the time of the 2010 earthquake, 61.7% of Haitians lived
on less than US$1.25 per day (UNICEF,2013) and only
48.7% were literate (UNESCO Institute for Statistics,
2012). Even though roughly 85% of households had
access to a mobile phone (Pereira, 2010), only 8.4% of
Haitians were internet users, that is, people who had used
the internet in the previous 12 months from any device (e.g.,
computers, mobile phones, etc.) (World Bank, 2015).
Likewise, in 2014, 82.5% of Nepalis had a mobile phone
subscription but only 15.4% were internet users (World
Bank, 2015). The discrepancy between the male and
female literacy rates in Nepal is similar to the one found
in Haiti (75.1% versus 57.4%, respectively). This suggests
that in both countries digital inequalities are highly gen-
dered (Central Bureau of Statistics, 2014). Literacy rates
also vary widely by district: the overall literacy rate in
Kathmandu is for example 86.3% whereas in Rautahat (a
rural district bordering India) it is only 42%. The latter is
also marked by exceptionally high levels of both gender and
caste-based discrimination (UNFCO, 2013).
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